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The impacts of climate change on human systems depend not only on the level of emissions but also on 
how inherently vulnerable these systems are to the changing climate. There are large uncertainties on the 
future degrees of development and structure of societies and economies and hence the assessment of 
climate change effects is complex. One way to deal with this complexity is by using scenario analysis that 
takes account of these socio-economic differences. The challenge of developing scenarios is to identify the 
dimensions along which societies and economies evolve over time in such a way that covers sufficiently 
different  vulnerability  patterns.  This  conceptual  effort  is  critical  for  the  development  of  informative 
scenarios. Here, we identify three dimensions on which to build a new set of scenarios to assess climate 
change effects on human systems. The dimensions we propose take into account the most relevant factors 
that define the vulnerability of human systems to climate change and their ability to adapt to it. 
Introduction  
Since  its  first  report  in  1990,  the 
Intergovernmental  Panel  on  Climate  Change 
(IPCC) has aimed to provide  information on 
climate  change  risks  and  policy  options,  to 
inform  decision-  and  policy-makers.  Of 
particular  importance  is  the  assessment  of 
possible  climate  change  impacts,  adaptation 
options, and  vulnerabilities (IAV). The 1992 
United  Nations  Convention  on  Climate 
Change  commits  to  avoiding  ‘dangerous’ 
climate  change,  and  as  such  an  IAV 
assessment  is  a  critical  component  in 
determining  policy  targets  for  emissions 
reduction
1. Information related to impacts are 
also  relevant  for  designing  anticipatory 
climate  change  adaptation  strategies,  and  in 
assessing the  financial resources that will  be 
necessary to implement them.  
One difficulty in IAV assessment, however, is 
the fact that future climate change impacts – 
and  the  desirability  of  potential  adaptation 
options – depend on  many uncertain  factors. 
Some of these factors are environmental, such 
as  the  response  of  the  climate  system  to 
additional  forcing  from  greenhouse  gases 
(GHG), or the ability of  ecosystems to cope 
with  increasing  temperatures  and  modified 
climate patterns. Climate change impacts and 
adaptation options will, however, also depend 
on  many  socio-economic  determinants.  The 
amount  of  GHG  that  will  be  emitted  in  the 
future and the ability of affected societies to 
cope  with  and  adapt  to  climate  change  are 
especially  important.  These  socio-economic 
determinants  of  climate  change  impacts  and 
adaptation  options  will  be  driven  by  future 
demographic, economic, technological, social, 
and  cultural  changes.  Any  assessment  of 
climate change impacts and adaptation options 
thus  needs  to  make  assumptions  about these 
drivers  and  their  future  pathways.  To 
investigate  future  climate  change,  a  scenario 
of  the  pathways  of  these  drivers  throughout 
this century is therefore necessary.  Author’s copy.                    
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Considering  the  wide  uncertainties  affecting 
these drivers, using one such scenario only is 
inappropriate.  Climate  change  vulnerabilities 
would be underestimated if investigated only 
using  optimistic  assumptions,  assuming  for 
instance  that  extreme  poverty  disappears 
rapidly  in  the  next  decades.  Such  an 
underestimation  would  then  lead  to 
inappropriate policy advice on adaptation and 
mitigation  policies.  Using  only  pessimistic 
scenarios  would  similarly  create  a  bias  in 
estimates  and  proposed  policies.  To  make 
robust  decisions,  i.e.  those  that  yield 
acceptable  outcomes  for  a  broad  range  of 
plausible futures
2, it is thus necessary to use a 
set  of  scenarios  that  spans  the  range  of 
possible futures. 
Such  sets  of  scenarios  have  already  been 
developed  to  investigate  climate  change  and 
other  large-scale  environmental  and  energy 
issues;  see,  for  example,  the  Millennium 
Ecosystem  Assessment
3  or  World  Energy 
Outlook
4.  For  climate  change,  the  Special 
Report  on  Emission  Scenarios  (SRES)
5  was 
produced  by  the  IPCC  to  provide  baseline 
scenarios  for  its  Third  Assessment  Report. 
These  scenarios  represent  “possible  and 
consistent” futures for the world, up to 2100. 
They  assume  –  counterfactually  –  that  there 
are  no  climate  change  or  climate  policies, 
which  is  why  they  are  referred  to  as 
“baselines.” 
The SRES scenarios were built by a working 
group  including  academic  scientists, 
environmental  organizations,  industrial 
scientists, engineers, economists and systems 
analysts. From different possible pathways of 
the  main  drivers  of  society’s  evolution, 
including  for  example  population  trends, 
technological  change,  and  economic  growth, 
etc., they created “storylines” or “narratives”, 
i.e. qualitative descriptions of plausible future 
world  evolutions  from  which  quantitative 
modelling  exercises  could  then  be  derived. 
Depending on the retained assumptions and on 
the  numerical  model  that  was  used,  the 
narratives  lead  to  scenarios  with  different 
levels of GHG emissions, resulting in different 
amplitudes  and  patterns  of  climate  change. 
They  also  lead  to  scenarios  with  different 
socio-economic  pathways,  which  can  be 
translated  into  different  climate  change 
vulnerabilities.  
As  explained  in  Moss  and  colleagues
6, 
however, the SRES scenarios will be replaced, 
and new frameworks to develop a new set of 
scenarios have been suggested
7,8. Like SRES 
scenarios, these scenarios will lead to different 
vulnerabilities  and  to  different  GHG 
emissions.  However,  in  the  new  approach, 
climate and socio-economic scenarios are built 
in  parallel,  starting  from  scenarios  of  future 
radiative  forcings,  known  as  Representative 
Concentration  Pathways,  or  RCPs.  Climate 
modellers assess the climate response to these 
forcings,  while  other  modellers  build  socio-
economic  scenarios  consistent  with  these 
RCPs. Unlike SRES scenarios, some of these 
new socio-economic scenarios will thus have 
to include mitigation policies.
7,8 
New scenarios are needed to take into account 
new data and knowledge on technologies and 
preferences,  and  recent  economic  and 
demographic  evolutions.  But  most 
importantly, the SRES scenarios were mainly 
developed  to  support  mitigation  policy 
analysis,  and  they  have  revealed  difficult  to 
use  by  the  IAV  community.  To  help  the 
scientific  community  provide  a  consistent 
vision on climate risks and policies, the new 
scenarios will have to be appropriate both for 
mitigation and IAV analysis.  Author’s copy.                    
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Here, we aim to contribute to the production 
of  these  new  scenarios  by  investigating  the 
specific needs of the IAV community. To do 
so,  we  first  explain  how  socio-economic 
scenarios can  be used  for IAV analysis, and 
we  highlight  the  limits  and  strengths  of  this 
approach.  Then,  we  review  the  major 
vulnerabilities  to  climate  change,  and 
investigate  their  main  socio-economic 
determinants.  Finally,  we  propose to  build  a 
few  narratives  that  cover  a  broad  range  of 
possible  evolutions  for  these  determinants, 
organized  along  three  main  dimensions: 
“homogenous” vs. “heterogeneous”; “poverty 
and  development”  vs.  “inclusive 
development”; and “environment-oriented” vs. 
“environmentally-stressed.” 
Scenarios for IAV analysis 
Assessing impacts and adaptation options can 
be done using  counterfactual  “IAV-baseline” 
scenarios, i.e. scenarios that assume no climate 
change (and thus no impacts). A comparison 
between  an  IAV-baseline  and  a  scenario 
including  climate  change  and  its  impacts 
informs on the costs and benefits of adaptation 
actions,  and  on  residual  climate  change 
impacts.  Unlike  SRES  scenarios  that  have 
been designed mainly to serve as baselines to 
assess  mitigation  policies,  IAV-baseline 
scenarios will be used to assess impacts and 
adaptation policies and may include emission 
reduction policies.  
IAV analyses based on this scenario approach 
frequently  focus on  a region or a subsystem 
(e.g., an ecosystem, an economic sector), and 
assume  that  the  rest  of  the  world  is  left 
unaffected by climate change and follows the 
evolution  described  in  the  baseline  scenario. 
As a consequence, they often do not take into 
account  the  interactions  of  climate  change 
impacts  among  regions,  such  as  through 
commodity trade, or subsystems such as when 
water,  energy,  and  agriculture  interact. 
Moreover,  this  approach  may  create 
inconsistencies as it fails to include how the 
impacts  of  climate  change  modify  GHG 
emissions.  
The  scenario  approach  may  also  be 
questionable  in  cases  of  impacts  that  are  so 
large  that  the  scenario  including  climate 
change differs substantially from the baseline 
scenario.  In  that  case,  the  vulnerability 
determinants (e.g., the number of people with 
no  access  to  drinking  water  and  sanitation) 
may  be  significantly  different  in  the  IAV-
baseline and in the climate-change scenarios, 
and baseline vulnerabilities cannot be used to 
assess  climate  change  impacts.  Nevertheless, 
this  methodology  makes  possible  the 
investigation  of  individual  regions  and 
subsystems independently from each other, a 
crucial advantage in IAV analysis. 
There is another approach used to investigate 
IAV  issues,  based  on  global-scale  Integrated 





13,  among 
others
14. These models do not share the same 
limits  as  scenario-based  approaches.  In 
particular, they are able to provide insights on 
interactions  among  impacts  and  to  explore 
possible  systemic  changes  due  to  climate. 
They  can  also  include  the  feedback  from 
impacts  to  emissions.  But  IAMs  cannot 
replace  detailed  local  and  subsystem  IAV 
analyses,  which  are  too  complex  for  global-
scale  analysis.  As  a  consequence,  scenario-
based IAV analyses are  likely to remain the 
standard  for  the  IPCC  Fifth  Assessment 
Report.  
Challenges in scenario building 
The impacts of climate change will depend on 
the  sensitivity  of  affected  societies  and Author’s copy.                    
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economies  to  changes  in  climate  conditions, 
and on their ability to adapt to it. The IAV-
baseline scenarios thus need to cover the most 
influential  determinants  of  climate  change 
vulnerability.  These  determinants  can  be 
identified from the IPCC review of the “key 
vulnerabilities” to climate change
15 and from 
the more recent literature that followed. These 
vulnerabilities  can  be  summarized  in  four 
(overlapping) categories.  
The  first  category  encompasses  climate 
impacts  on  agriculture  and  food  security, 
especially  in  countries  that  depend  on 
agricultural  production  and  export  for  their 
livelihood  and  economic  sustainability.  This 
topic  has  been  covered  in  the  literature  in 
relation to agriculture
16,  fisheries
17,  and  food 
security and livelihood
18. The second category 
includes the health
19-21 and economic impacts 
on poor urban and rural communities that lack 
access  to  basic  services,  face  multiple 
stressors
22,23  and  food  security  issues
24  and 
have  low  adaptive  capacity,  e.g.  low-
productivity food-producing farmers and slum 
dwellers. The third category of vulnerabilities 
comprises impacts through extreme events
25-30 
like heat waves, floods and storms, especially 
but  not  uniquely  in  urban  areas.  The  fourth 
and final category consists of impacts through 
increased natural resource scarcity (e.g., water 
scarcity  and  soil  degradation),  biodiversity 
losses, and reduction in ecosystem services.
31 
The  welfare  impact  of  these  physical 
vulnerabilities  will  depend  on  the  adaptive 
capacity of affected populations, i.e. the ability 
to  moderate  potential  damages,  to  take 
advantage of opportunities, or to cope with the 
consequences  of  global  warming
23,32-34.  This 
adaptive  capacity  depends  on  financial  and 
technical  capacity,  access  to  global  financial 
capital,  education  and  health,  institutional 
capacity  and  governance,  political  weight  in 
national and international policy debates, and 
the  support  received  from  other  regions  or 
countries (including  foreign development aid 
and more specialized adaptation support).  
These  categories  do  not  include  all  factors 
influencing climate change impacts, especially 
considering  the  high  level  of  uncertainty  in 
this  domain.  Based  on  current  knowledge, 
however,  these  categories  appear  to  include 
the  largest vulnerabilities, and we  argue that 
IAV-baseline  scenarios  ought  to  cover  their 
drivers  and  the  uncertainties  that  surround 
them. 
Proposed dimensions of the narratives 
One way of constructing narratives for IAV-
baselines  could  be  to  create  a  very  large 
number of scenarios that cover all  identified 
uncertainties,  and  to  assess  climate  change 
impacts and adaptation options in each of the 
scenarios. Then, it would be possible to select 
the few scenarios that are especially relevant 
for  any  particular  decision  that  needs  to  be 
made: the most relevant scenarios may not be 
the  same  for  analysing  climate  impacts  and 
adaptation options in the agriculture sector or 
in the energy sector. This approach – labelled 
“scenario  discovery”  by  Groves  and 
Lempert
35–  is  however  difficult  to  apply  to 
IAV  analyses,  considering  the  difficulty  and 
resources involved in any impact or adaptation 
study. It appears unrealistic to investigate all 
climate  impacts  and  adaptation  options  in 
more than a few scenarios.   
As  an  alternative,  we  propose  to  follow  the 
classical  approach  used  for  the  SRES 
scenarios,  and  to  build  a  small  set  of 
qualitative  narratives  organized  along  a  few 
dimensions that summarize what we expect to 
be  the  main  determinant  of  the  key 
vulnerabilities to climate change. Importantly, 
these  dimensions  are  not  the  driving  forces Author’s copy.                    
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behind  the  changes,  but  the  results  of  a 
combination  of  driving  forces  (e.g., 
demographic changes, technological change). 
To  cover  as  extensively  as  possible  the 
potential  futures  of  these  determinants,  and 
thus  the  possible  futures  of  climate  change 
vulnerabilities,  we  propose  to  build  the 
narratives  from  a  combination  of  three 
choices,  one  for  each  of  the  three  following 
dimensions. 
The  first  of  our  proposed  dimensions 
considers the possibility of a “homogeneous” 
world  vs.  a  “heterogeneous”  world.  In  a 
more homogeneous world, the economic and 
spatial  structure  of  developing  countries 
converges  rapidly  toward  the  economic  and 
spatial  structure  of  industrialized  countries. 
For  instance,  the  share  of  agriculture  in 
developing-world  economies  decreases  in 
terms of GDP and exports. Also, urbanization 
rates  converge  around  developed-country 
standards;  and  available  technologies  are 
similar  in  industrialized  and  developing 
countries.  Conversely,  in  a  more 
heterogeneous  world,    developing-country 
economies remain  for an extended period of 
time  based  on  agriculture,  raw-material 
extraction,  and  tourism.  These  countries 
remain  largely  rural.  In  such  a  world, 
developing  countries  are  more  dependent  on 
rich countries for high-technology goods and 
can balance their imports only thanks to low-
value-added  goods  and  services.  In  contrast 
with  the  globalization  dimension  used  in 
SRES scenarios, this dimension is not mainly 
about trade and openness, even though a more 
homogenous  world  has  more  international 
trade  than  more  heterogeneous  ones.  This 
dimension  is  important  for  IAV  analysis  for 
two  main  reasons.  First,  depending  on  how 
developing  countries  and  their  economic 
structure  evolve,  the  nature  of  their 
vulnerabilities  will  be  different.  Economies 
that  remain  rural  and  rely  heavily  on 
agriculture  will  have  different  vulnerabilities 
than  countries  that  become  urban  and  shift 
toward industries and services. Agriculture in 
developing  countries  is  likely  one  of  the 
sectors  most  negatively  affected  by  climate 
change
16. In a more homogenous world, these 
countries  would  be  less  vulnerable  because 
agriculture  becomes  less  important  in  their 
economy. They would also be at reduced risks 
of food insecurity because of better access to 
world food markets thanks to alternative non-
agricultural  exports
36.  However,  their  urban 
population may be more vulnerable to natural 
disasters  such  as  floods,  and  to  network 
disruptions affecting electricity distribution or 
transport networks.  
Our second proposed dimension distinguishes 
between  an  “inclusive  development”  in 
which  extreme  poverty  disappears  rapidly 
vs.  a  “growth  and  poverty”  development 
with  a  significant  share  of  people  remaining 
below  the  poverty  line.  This  dimension 
represents  inequalities  within  countries  and 
regions. In a more inclusive world, the poorest 
communities have a voice in political choices, 
governance  takes  into  account  poverty 
reduction as an important policy goal, and the 
share of people in extreme poverty is rapidly 
reduced.  Almost  everybody  gets  access  to 
basic  services,  such  as  health  services, 
education,  energy  and  transport,  drinking 
water  and  sanitation,  financial  services, 
secured  land tenure and decent housing,  risk 
management practices (e.g., buying insurance 
or  building  dams).  In  a  more  “poverty  and 
development”  oriented  world,  a  fraction  of 
poor-country  population  is  excluded  from 
these  services  (e.g.,  urban  poor  in  informal 
settlements).  Development  is  uneven  within 
countries,  with  some  regions  lagging  behind 
average development (e.g., inland vs. coastal Author’s copy.                    
Published in Nature Climate Change 1, n. 3 (june 2011): 151-155. | DOI: 10.1038/NCLIMATE1135 
  6
areas),  creating  large  pockets  of  extreme 
poverty. This dimension is partly independent 
of the previous one, because extreme poverty 
may either disappear or increase, regardless of 
economic  structure  and  aggregate  economic 
growth.  This  dimension  can  also  include 
differences in terms of governance efficiency, 
e.g.  in  the  ability  to  efficiently  deal  with 
conflicts  over  resources.  It  is  important  for 
IAV  analysis  to  take  into  account  this 
dimension  because  poor  communities  are 
considered  the  most  vulnerable  to  climate 
change
37.  They  are  more  exposed  to 
environmental  conditions  and  rely  more 
heavily  on  unmediated  environmental 
resources  (e.g.,  their  access  to  water  is  not 
mediated by infrastructure). They also have to 
cope  with  multiple  stressors
23  and  have  less 
capacity to adapt, because of lower financial 
capacity,  education  and  health,  institutional 
capacity, or political weight
32.  
The last dimension in our proposal opposes an 
“environment-oriented”  world  vs.  an 
“environmentally-stressed”  world.  In  an 
environment-oriented  world,  policies, 
technologies and lifestyles lead to an efficient 
use  of  natural  resources  and  reduce 
environmental stresses. In an environmentally-
stressed world, water-use is inefficient, energy 
and  mobility  demands  are  growing.  Soil 
depletion and degradation are accelerated and 
reduce  agriculture  productivity  and  increase 
natural risks (e.g., floods). Biodiversity losses 
are  large  and  ecosystem  services  are 
threatened. In this world, the unsustainable use 
of natural resources is creating environmental 
stresses, so that climate change affects already 
vulnerable  environments.  This  dimension  is 
largely independent of the previous ones, since 
economic development and poverty reduction 
may be done – temporarily – with or without 
efficient  use  of  natural  resources.  This 
dimension  is  also  independent  from  the 
implementation  of  climate  policies.  Indeed, 
many  environmental  problems  improve 
spontaneously  as  country  development 
exceeds a certain level (e.g., city air pollution), 
while  GHG  emissions  may  keep  increasing 
with development, at least in some countries 
(the  literature on the Environmental  Kuznets 
Curve explores these  issues
38). It matters for 
IAV  analysis  because  ecosystems  ability  to 
cope with climate change depends on the other 
stresses they have to cope with
39, and because 
additional  resource  scarcity  from  climate 
change  can  have  different  consequences 
depending  on  how  they  are  managed.  For 
instance, reduced rainfall has larger economic 
consequences if existing resources are already 
stretched  by  inappropriate  agriculture 
production and if ground water is not usable 
because of pollution or salinization
40. 
Many other factors will be important in world 
evolutions  and  will  influence  vulnerability. 
For  instance,  other  factors  such  as  the 
consequences of the 2008 financial crisis may 
be more important for near-term vulnerability, 
e.g., up to 2030. Also,  since climate change 
impacts  and  adaptation  options  are  very 
context-specific  and  require  local  studies, 
global  scenarios  will  need  to  be  downscaled 
into local scenarios
41. At a local scale, some 
factors that are secondary at the global scale 
may become dominant. But at the global scale 
and  over  the  long  term,  i.e.  up to  2100, the 
three  dimensions  we  propose  in  this  paper 
appear  to  us  as  the  main  drivers  of  climate 
change vulnerability.  
One way forward  
To  build  narratives,  two  possibilities  can  be 
selected for each dimension,  leading to eight 
narratives – and eight IAV-baseline scenarios 
–  that  can  be  located  along  our  three  axes 
(homogeneous  vs.  heterogeneous;  inclusive Author’s copy.                    
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vs.  poverty  and  development;  environment-
oriented vs. environmentally-stressed; Fig 1). 
These dimensions provide thus a mapping of 
future  possible  worlds.  In  addition  to  these 
dimensions,  it  has  been  proposed  that  IAV-
baseline  scenarios  may  include  mitigation 
policies, such that GHG emissions follow one 
of  the  RCPs
7,8.  Comparing  climate  change 
impacts and adaptation options with different 
mitigation policies (leading to different RCPs) 
in  the  same  narratives  would  inform  on  the 
benefits from mitigation.  
Figure 1: Narrative representation with three dimensions. 
The possibilities for each dimension  need to 
be contrasted enough to lead to narratives that 
are  sufficiently  distinct  in  their  vulnerability 
patterns. The quantification of these narratives 
remains  to  be  done,  and  additional  work  is 
needed to build scenarios. In particular, it will 
be  necessary  to  decide  how  contrasted  the 
narratives  should  be  (e.g.,  what  is  the 
difference  in  urbanization  rate  between  the 
homogenous and heterogeneous worlds?), and 
to  build  them  in  a  way  that  ensures  their 
internal consistency. Such quantification may 
show that the eight narratives are not equally 
realistic  and  consistent.  A  careful  quantified 
analysis may even lead us to discard some of 
the  combinations  of  drivers  displayed  in 
Figure 1. But before the scientific community 
starts  to  run  models  and  invest  in  scenario 
building,  a  debate  on  the  most  appropriate 
dimensions of the analysis needs to be held. 
We hope this proposal can help to initiate and 
contribute to this important debate. 
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